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How to Solve Argentina's Debt Crisis:
Will the IMF's Plan Work?
Celeste Boeri*

I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2002, the Argentine government announced it would default on
$141 billion in public sector debt-the largest default of a sovereign state in
history. Having devalued its currency and gone through five presidents within a
few weeks, Argentina was on a downward spiral and could no longer sustain its
debt payments. Government limitations on bank withdrawals, an attempt to
prevent a run on banks, resulted in violent street protests. Argentina's debt crisis
renewed debate over the need for an international mechanism through which
countries can declare bankruptcy.' Nine months later, at the conclusion of the
2002 annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the
World Bank in Washington, D.C., delegates approved the creation of a sovereign
debt restructuring plan that would enable countries suffering severe financial
crises to renegotiate their payment terms with creditors.2
The plan is not a novel one. An IMF proposal for the creation of a
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, which would include a dispute
resolution forum, was discussed and presented by Anne Krueger, the First
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, at previous IMF meetings.3 Now that
the IMF has won the approval of many developed countries, it will move
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(Sept 29, 2002). ("The idea [of establishing an international bankruptcy court] has been
around for years but only gathered support in recent months after the economic collapse and
subsequent default of Argentina."); Alan Beattie, A Better Way for Countries to Default, Fin
Times (Nov 6, 2001) ("The crisis in Argentina highlights the need for international
agreement on how to deal with sovereign debt problems.").
See Harry Dunphy, FinancialLeaders PromiseAction to Help Markets, Bankrupt Nations, AP Wires
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beyond the drawing board and begin developing tangible debt restructuring
measures to present by the spring of 2003. Horst Koehler, head of the IMF,
described the approval of their plan as "a kind of breakthrough ... . There is a
recognition that there is a gap in the international financial architecture."4
The IMF proposed a "twin track approach" comprised of two parts that
are to be simultaneously pursued: 1) a "contractual approach" involving the use
of collective action clauses in sovereign bond contracts, which describe ex ante
what will occur in the event of a default, to keep creditors from halting the
restructuring process; and 2) a "statutory approach" allowing a supermajority of
creditors to establish new, legally binding terms with the debtor country, and
creating a dispute resolution forum to resolve disputes that may arise in the
process.' The International Monetary and Financial Committee, consisting of
finance ministers from both developed and developing nations, is looking
forward to the final version of the IMF's plan, especially the plan for an
international bankruptcy court.
However, not all have been in favor of the IMF's proposed sovereign debt
plan. At first, the leaders of the Group of Seven industrialized nations ("G7")the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, Germany, and Britain-only
supported the contractual approach of including collective action clauses in
foreign emerging markets' bonds.6 The top emerging economies ("G24"), which
the plan was designed to help, as well as Wall Street, were not as supportive of
the contractual approach. Even more contentious was the IMF's plan to form an
international bankruptcy court. While the G24 stated that they would be "openminded" toward the G7's proposal to include collective action clauses, they were
"skeptical" about the international bankruptcy court. 7 Wall Street representatives
had a similar negative reaction.
Following a year of debate over whether to pursue collective action clauses
and an international bankruptcy court, developed nations increasingly supported
pursuing both options simultaneously in "a sort of belt and braces approach." 8
The US administration has moved beyond solely supporting the contractual
approach to endorsing the IMF's progress toward a two-track approach. In fact,
the entire G7, along with Belgium, Holland, Sweden, and Switzerland, has
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See Mark Egan, USA: WRAPUP 2-Sovereign Bankrupty Plan Gains Momentum, Rtr Eng News
21:40 (Sept 27, 2002).

Vol. 4 No. 1

How to Solve Argentina's Debt Crisis: Will the IMF's Plan Work?

Boeri

endorsed the IMF's twin track approach at side meetings held during the 2002
IMF and World Bank annual conference. The IMF is expected to present
concrete proposals concerning the establishment of an international bankruptcy
court by spring of 2003.
The most controversial point of the proposed reforms remains the
formation of an international bankruptcy court, which falls under the IMF's
second track: the statutory approach. Accordingly, Part II of this Development
describes the IMF's statutory approach, emphasizing the international
bankruptcy court. Part III argues that from Argentina's perspective, the IMF's
statutory approach would not be an effective solution to its current debt crisis
due to its history of difficult relations with the IMF and the potential it creates
for infringing on Argentina's sovereignty.' Part IV examines the legal and market
effects of the statutory approach and asserts that there are other means for
restructuring debt that would have a less negative impact on the value of
Argentine bonds. Three overall problems of international law posed by the
statutory approach are identified in Part V: conflicts of law created if it is applied
retroactively, cost-benefit analysis as it relates to the IMF's purpose, and
confusion concerning the IMF's role. Part VI synthesizes the foregoing analysis
and suggests that the IMF's plan is not a viable solution for Argentina.
II. THE IMF's STATUTORY APPROACH
The second track of the IMF's overall plan for sovereign debt restructuring
is the statutory approach. Under this approach, an international treaty would
empower the majority of creditors to bind all other creditors to the terms of a
renegotiated debt agreement with the debtor country.1 0 By eliminating the
requirement that the unanimous consent of all creditors be reached in order to
make changes to the terms of the debt agreement, minority interest creditors
would no longer be able to prevent restructuring by holding out. The treaty
would also establish a single dispute resolution forum with exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes between the debtor country and its creditors, as well as disputes
among creditors. The IMF argues that a single forum is necessary to maintain a
uniform standard and consistent interpretation of the treaty across all
jurisdictions. This treaty would be established through the enactment of an
amendment to the IMF's articles of agreement, which, once approved by twothirds of the member nations, would be binding on all parties.1'

0
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The statutory approach is still in the development stage. The IMF has not stated that the
approach will be implemented in Argentina, but has suggested that it should be. See Anne 0.
Krueger, Crisis Prevention and Resolulion: Lessons From Agentina, available online at
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/071702.htm> (visited Mar 30, 2003).
See Krueger, Prevenfing and Resolving FinandalCrises (cited in note 3).
See id.
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In a broad sense, the statutory approach accomplishes through public law
what the contractual approach of using collective action clauses accomplishes
through private law: it provides a predetermined mechanism for renegotiating
sovereign debt in the event of a default, and thus reduces transactions costs,
increases predictability, and minimizes holdout problems. The contentious point
of the statutory approach has been the formation of an international dispute
resolution forum, also referred to as an international bankruptcy court. The
court's role, which has been equated to that of a domestic bankruptcy court,
would first be to administer creditor claims, and second to resolve disputes
between creditors and debtor countries, as well as disputes among creditors. 2
The IMF's statutory approach would require that every member nation treat the
court's decisions as legally binding. "In other words, they would need to be
treated as though they were decisions of each member country's national
cOurts."' 3
The IMF laid out a detailed method of selection for determining who will
preside over the bankruptcy court. 4 A three-member panel would be selected
through a five-step process beginning with a list of candidates nominated by
each IMF member country. The list would be narrowed by the IMF's Executive
Board to about twenty-one individuals who then need to be approved by the
Board of Governors. The members appointed to the court would then elect a
Presiding Member who would in turn select a three-member panel for each
country in crisis on a case-by-case basis.
III. ARGENTINA'S PERSPECTIVE
While other similar proposals for a sovereign debt system may be beneficial
for Argentina, the IMF's proposal would instead be problematic for two main
reasons.15 First, Argentina has a history of difficult relations and mistrust with
the IMF. Second, the IMF may encroach on Argentina's sovereignty, raising
questions of enforcement and legitimacy. Nevertheless, Argentina's debt must
somehow be restructured and a domestic bankruptcy-like proceeding for
sovereign states is precisely what some international civil society movements
have proposed. 6
12
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The problems associated with the retroactive application of the statutory approach to
Argentina's existing debt are discussed in Part V.
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Co-rexponsibiliyfor Argentinas Crisis - and the Need for Independent Resolution (Jubilee Plus/New
Economic Foundation 2001), available online at <http://www.jubileeplus.org/analysis/
reports/ittakes twoto-tango.pd f> (visited Mar 21, 2003). See also Centro de Ex
Legisladores, Constituyentes, Concejales y Secretarios de Cimara, Jubilados y Pensionados de
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Argentina's relations with the IMF have a history of sometimes being less
than cordial, which emanates from Argentina's resentment toward the
conditions imposed by the IMF on its domestic fiscal policy as a prerequisite to
securing new IMF loans. Furthermore, there is a danger that under the statutory
approach the IMF's leverage to impose such conditions will increase, thereby
making it even less favorable from Argentina's perspective.
The underlying causes for Argentina's default involve multiple players and
are beyond the scope of this Development. However, Argentina's inability to
secure additional loans from the IMF, combined with overspending, were
immediate causes of its most recent default in January 2002. After Argentina
announced its default, its animosity with the IMF became even more public. 7
After months of failed discussions, the two finally returned to positive
negotiations in September 2002. Given the history of their relationship, it is
difficult to imagine Argentina submitting to discussions with its other creditors
under the indirect supervision of the IMF.
The statutory approach would create an entirely new debt restructuring
system with rules Argentina would be obliged to abide by in good faith or risk
losing the ability to secure new IMF loans. Though the IMF insists that "an
amendment of the articles would be used only as a legal tool to empower the
creditors and the debtor, not as a way to extend the IMF's legal authority,"' 8 the
IMF could easily condition new loans on abidance with the statutory approach,
thereby gaining an additional mechanism to force Argentina into adopting its
domestic fiscal policy recommendations.

Salta ("CELEC"), Petition for International Arbitration, Verification of Legalioy; Renegotiation of
Agenina's Foreign Debt (June 20, 2002), available online at <http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/
jmi/jmi-news/argentina200602.htm>
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on foreign debt until an arbitration applying the principles of a Chapter 9 procedure is
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See Chris Anstey, IMF's Krueger Warns Atgentina Default to Official Leaders Would Cut Off Aid,

AFX News 10:50 (Sept 26, 2002) (IMF deputy managing director Anne Krueger said, "I
don't think it would be the end of the world if negotiations [with Argentina] broke down.").
See also Mark Egan, USA: Update 1-Not the End of the World if
Aentina Talks Fail-IMF,Rtr
Eng News 10:48 (Sept 26, 2002) ("Krueger's comments were eerily similar to those by
Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna on Wednesday, who defiantly said the government was
capable of vanquishing a chaotic four-year depression without outside help.").
Krueger, Preventing and Resolving FinancialCrises (cited in note 3).
See Ross P. Buckley, Rescheduling as the Groundwork for Seconday Markets in Sovereign Debt,
26 DenvJ Intl L & Poly 299, 301 (1998) (When Argentina defaulted in the 1980s and was in
the midst of renegotiating its debt with the Bank Advisory Committee, the IMF refused to
extend new loans several times unless the debtor country agreed to adopt a "structural
adjustment program.").

Spring 2003

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

The same is true of the bankruptcy court. Though the IMF urges that it
would be completely independent, 0 it is difficult, if not impossible, to sever a
court that will derive its legal existence from an amendment to the articles of the
IMF. Furthermore, as discussed above, the IMF essentially selects the members
of the court. Under these conditions, it is no wonder Argentina, along with
many other countries in similar economic positions, is opposed to the statutory
approach and especially the bankruptcy court.
The tenuous separation between the IMF's traditional role as a creditor and
new potential role as leader of sovereign debt restructuring thus poses the
danger that the IMF will gain a significant amount of control over Argentina's
relations with other creditors and become an overwhelming force in the nation's
economic policies. This raises several concerns regarding national sovereignty.
While it is possible that under such a scheme Argentina's outstanding bonds may
become more valuable, or at least stabilize in value (because certain foreign
investors or developed countries would perceive greater security in having
Argentina's economic policy run by the IMF), such arrangements fly in the face
of internationally accepted principles of national sovereignty. Argentina is a
sovereign nation with a right to determine its own fiscal policies, regardless of
21
how those policies are perceived by outsiders.
In addition to the problems of legitimacy discussed above, there are
enforcement issues as well. The dispute resolution forum proposed by the IMF
is intended to be legally binding in the same way a decision of an Argentine
court would be. However, in practice Argentina's judiciary may not have the
power to enforce the forum's decisions. While the IMF can use its lending
capacities to ensure that certain economic reforms are made, it cannot control
how the policies and reforms are implemented. In fact, Argentina is so rife with
political corruption that it can hardly implement its own reforms. 23 Dependence
20
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Krueger, Preventing and Resolving Financial Crises (cited in note 3) ("Any dispute resolution
forum would have to operate-and be seen to operate-independently not only of the
[Executive] Board, but also of the governors, management and staff of the IMF.").
For a discussion of how the IMF's conditions do not necessarily enhance the lendercountry's economic growth and are sometimes even counterproductive see Joseph E. Stiglitz,
GlobaliZationand Its Discontents46-52 (Norton 2002).
See Geoffrey P. Miller, ConstitutionalMoments, Precommitment, and FundamentalReform: The Case
of Agentina, 71 Wash U L Q 1061, 1080-81 (1993). See also Tom Darin Liskey, Argentina's
Menem Tells IMF He'd Agree to Aid Conditions, Dow Jns Intl News 8:18 (Sept 27, 2002)
(Argentina's appeals court ruled that the President's order converting dollar-denominated
bank deposits into pesos was unconstitutional. This has not had much effect in practice other
than to demonstrate to the IMF that there is little agreement among government branches
on fiscal policy.).
See Mark Egan, Update 2-IMF Urges End to War of Words With Argentina, Rtr Eng News 12:24
(Sept 26, 2002) ("The IMF chief also said Argentina displayed a marked 'lack of respect of
law,' which also had to be addressed, noting that corruption was rampant in the business
environment there.").
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on this legally enforced strategy is likely to be ineffective. Argentina would more
likely abide with the international bankruptcy court's decisions if instead it relied
on market forces to reach a mutually beneficial solution.
The Club of Paris is a past example of this type of successful debt
renegotiation. In 1956, when Argentina was on the verge of defaulting on its
loans, its creditors met in Paris and resolved to renegotiate their loan contracts
with Argentina and created the Club of Paris, an institution designed to resolve
debt controversies.24 Argentina was able to meet its obligations through interest
rate concessions and a longer period for repayment in exchange for agreeing to
reduce its risk of future default. Unlike the IMF, the Club of Paris is a private
creditors' organization that does not produce legally binding results and often
seeks the advice of the IMF and the World Bank in resolving disputes. It is
effective because of natural market forces: "It is the mutually assured benefit and
cost between the parties that permit such an arrangement. ... The theory
reduces to a simple comparison of the costs of agreement and costs of
disagreement."2
Debt restructuring also became necessary in the 1980s when Argentina,
along with several other Latin American countries, defaulted on its international
loans. Its principal creditors, consisting of about a dozen of the largest
international banks, joined together as the Bank Advisory Committee to
renegotiate the debts. The Committee used its influence to force the smaller
creditors to agree to the terms of the restructured debt. Now that the
composition of Argentina's debt has shifted from large syndicated bank loans
managed by an identifiable group, to public bonds held by thousands, neither
the Club of Paris nor the Bank Association Committee are the appropriate
forum for restructuring Argentina's debt. However, their relative success may be
instructive for the development of a mechanism that achieves nearly selfenforcing, mutually beneficial solutions to which Argentina would be more
amenable.
IV. LEGAL AND MARKET EFFECTS
Since this shift in the composition of sovereign debt, from syndicated bank
loans to bonds held by multitudes of creditors, the sheer number and diversity
of private creditors have made coordination significantly more difficult. The
IMF's statutory approach is advantageous in such a situation since it provides a
single forum for the multitude of creditors and minimizes holdout problems.
However, there are other means to these ends that may be more favorable to
both debtor countries and their creditors. The statutory approach may
24

See Mashaalah Rahnama-Moghadam, David A. Dilts, and Hedayeh Samavati, The Clubs of
London & Paris, 53 Disp ResolJ 71, 72 (Nov 1998).

25
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potentially reduce the value of foreign bonds and discourage future investors
who fear becoming the minority bondholder bound to the terms of the majority.
There are even concerns that the plan could lead to an increase in the number of
defaults.26
The IMF's statutory approach would allow bondholders to change the core
terms of their agreement by a supermajority vote, rather than requiring the
traditional unanimous consent. This voting mechanism is designed to prevent
minority bondholders from obstructing a new agreement by holding out to
secure the full expected return on their investments, which is sometimes
accomplished by filing a lawsuit in a US court.27 Not only do these lawsuits
impose an additional expense for Argentina, but they also encourage bad
investments as courts can be used to secure a full profit. More importantly, they
preclude the possibility of arriving at a mutually beneficial solution for the
repayment of outstanding bonds.
In response to the new dynamic of dispersed bondholders, several
proposals have been made that do not involve supervision by the IMF or similar
institutions and restrict or even obliterate the need for an international
bankruptcy court. Steven L. Schwarcz suggests that sovereign debt restructuring
is entirely possible without the supervision of a bankruptcy court, but rather
through an international convention.28 Rory Macmillan seconds the notion that a
sovereign debt work-out manager is unnecessary. 29 Other suggestions include
providing an indenture trustee for bondholders of foreign debt and developing
bondholder councils to work toward renegotiating foreign government debt in
30
the interest of the bondholders.
Argentina and Wall Street remain equally opposed to the IMF's statutory
approach, especially the bankruptcy court, because of its great adverse affects.
The two main arguments against it are: first, it would force a minority of
bondholders to accept the majority's terms of renegotiation, thereby
discouraging future investment; and second, it would force investors to rely on a
26

See James Nobles, Global Investing - The Debt Problems of a Silent Minoriy, Fin Times at P26
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(Oct 10, 2002).
See for example Argentina v Weltover, Inc, 504 US 607 (1992) (holding the lower court has
subject matter jurisdiction over a breach of contract action brought by bondholders against
the Republic of Argentina for extending its time for payment on the bonds). See also Samuel
E. Goldman, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 5 UCLA J Ind L & Foreign Aff 159 (2000).
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:A Bankruptgy ReorganizationApproach, 85
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See Rory Macmillan, Symposium: The New Latin American Debt Regime, Towards a Sovereign Debt
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Work-Out System, 16 NwJ Intl L & Bus 57 (1995).
See id (Macmillan proposes two forms of bondholders councils. The first only serves an
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advisory capacity because its members would be appointed by the government, whereas the
second version would have more decisionmaking authority since its members would be
elected by the bondholders.).
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shaky system of international law to recover investments, thereby increasing the
risk and lowering the price of bonds.
However, it is not absolutely certain that the statutory approach would
necessarily have a more adverse affect on future investors and the value of
bonds than would including collective action clauses under the contractual
approach, to which Wall Street and Argentina are not completely opposed. The
crucial difference between the two approaches would be choice of law. As long
as a specified country's law is controlling (be it the law of the United States or of
Argentina), and not a loose form of international law without precedent, the
statutory approach has the potential to become similar to the renegotiating
process currently conducted through the indenture trustee of a corporate bond.3'
Wall Street investors further argue that the IMF's statutory approach would
make defaulting easier and more attractive to developing countries, thus creating
a moral hazard problem.3 2 But there is little evidence supporting the notion that
a sovereign debt restructuring system would necessarily cause more defaults.
Argentina's lengthy history of defaults33 was caused by a government plagued
with military control, antitrade regimes, swings from socialist to democratic
policies, unstable economic policies, and severe corruption. And that only
roughly describes some of the domestic causes of the past fifty years or so. On
the international front, there has been a host of unsound investments leading to
unsustainable levels of debt for a developing country of only thirty-seven
million. Providing a consistent structure under which debt can be more
effectively managed is a valid goal.34 But a fundamental problem with the IMF's
statutory approach is the level of involvement the IMF seeks in a process that
should be kept as flexible as possible to allow for adjustment in the world
markets.
V. PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER
There are three main problems with the IMF's statutory approach. First, it
could potentially be applied retroactively to debt already incurred under different
31
32

33
34

See id at 86.
See Mike Esterl, Wall Street Blasts IMF Debt Restructuring Mechanism, Dow Jns Intl News 8:00
(Oct 16, 2002).

Argentina first defaulted on its loans in 1890, then again in the 1930s, then almost defaulted
in 1952 bringing about the Club of Paris (see note 24), but did default again in 1982.
On September 20, 2001, US Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neill, testified before the US
Senate Banking Committee that finding a better method to cope with global economic
challenges, such as loan defaults and devaluation in Latin America, remains near the top of
the government's list: "We need an agreement on an international bankruptcy law, so that we
can work with governments that in effect need to go through a Chapter 11 reorganization
instead of socializing the cost of bad decisions." Hearing on The Condition of the Financial
Markets before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Rep No S Hrg 107606, 107th Cong, 1st Sess 33 (2001) (testimony of Secretary Paul O'Neill).
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terms. Second, the costs of administration and enforcement may exceed the
benefits. Third, it generates confusion over the IMF's role in the world order as
a lender of last resort, not a sovereign debt manager. As will be discussed below,
each of these criticisms is especially problematic for Argentina. If, and when, the
statutory approach is implemented, it may be too late to have any positive
effects on Argentina.
If the statutory approach were to be applied retroactively to debt already
incurred by Argentina, the results could be disastrous. First, this would provoke
all sorts of conflicts of law35 that are beyond the scope of this Development,
especially for bondholders that may have relied on US laws, particularly New
York law, to govern their investments. Whatever debt terms were established
could suddenly be changed or found incongruent with the IMF's plan. Lack of
predictability could destabilize current investments and minimize the potential
for new capital. The possibilities are endless. A retroactive application could
hamper whatever progress had been made on the debt crisis.
Second, the statutory approach would present an uncertain increase in the
IMF's administrative and operating costs for functions that are out of its scope.
At the very least, additional time and resources would be spent on the rather
complex and bureaucratic process of selecting members to the court and on
attempts to enforce the court's decisions. The expenses could easily escalate,
thus taking away from funds that could instead be utilized for the IMF's
traditional purpose to serve as a lender of last resort.
Finally, there is a thin line dividing the role of the IMF as a lender of last
resort, and its new potential role as the founder of a sovereign bankruptcy
system. What should a country with a shaky economy, such as Argentina, do
first-request additional IMF loans or go through the IMF's bankruptcy
proceeding? A perfect illustration of the awkward position of the IMF is that the
IMF does not plan to include its own loans under the forum's jurisdiction given
their special nature.36 Argentina is estimated to owe $14.355 billion to the IMF,
$8.707 billion to the World Bank, and $8.606 billion to the Inter-American
Bank.37 Given that the IMF is the country's single largest creditor, its loan is an
important element of an overall successful restructuring plan. 38 Which debt
should Argentina's limited funds service first-the IMF debt or the debt
35

36
37

See Nobles, Global Investing - The Debt Problems of a Silent Minority, Fin Times at P26 (cited in
note 26) ("[T]he IMF proposal would allow contractual rights of minority creditors to be
obviated retroactively in total contradiction to the 'rule of law'.").
See Krueger, Preventing and Resolving FinancialCrises (cited in note 3).
Agentina Sees IMF Agreement; Will Miss World Bank Pqyment, Dow Jns Intl News 12:10 (Oct 8,
2002) (information current as ofJune 30, 2002).
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IMF's bankruptcy court will also likely exclude from its restructuring process claims held by
international organizations. See International Monetary Fund, The Design of the Sovereign Debt
Restructuting Mechanism--FurtherConsiderations
16, 72 (Nov 27, 2002), available online at
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf> (visited Mar 30, 2003).
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managed by the IMF bankruptcy court? Given this conundrum, Wall Street is
justifiably nervous. While the IMF has extended repayment deadlines and
negotiations are ongoing, if the dispute resolution forum truly functions
independently of the IMF Executive Board and Board of Governors, the new
fiscal policy may not be comprehensive since the interests of private creditors
may sometimes conflict with those of the IMF. If the forum takes into account
the IMF loans and therefore does not function independently, then there is a
greater risk of infringing upon Argentina's sovereignty, as discussed above.
VI. CONCLUSION
The IMF's statutory approach to restructuring sovereign debt will probably
not prove to be a viable solution to Argentina's debt crisis for several reasons.
First, Argentina harbors a great deal of animosity toward the IMF, and the plan
poses a real danger of infringing on its sovereignty by providing the IMF with
additional leverage to impose more conditions in the form of policy
recommendations. While the statutory approach may provide a mechanism with
which to coordinate multitudes of bondholders and prevent holdouts, there are
other viable solutions that address these issues with less bureaucratization.
However, the effect on bond values and investor confidence remains to be seen
and could probably be equated to the effects of the contractual approach to
utilizing collective action clauses. It is unlikely the IMF's plan would lead to an
increase in sovereign debt defaults.
Finally, the conflicts of law problems that would arise if the statutory
approach were to be retroactively applied to Argentina's billions of dollars of
existing debt, combined with potentially high costs of administration and
enforcement, and a confusing new role for the IMF as both lender and debt
manager, do not bode well for the plan's success. An effective sovereign debt
restructuring plan for Argentina would be one in which the process is less
politicized and offers mutually beneficial solutions that are self-enforcing. While
the notion of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism is good in theory, the
IMF is not the correct body to bring it into use.
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